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verdict aids subsequent review by presenting an explicit adjudication of each issue to an appellate court reviewing the merits 24 or
another trial court considering the collateral estoppel effect of the
judgment. 25 Finally, such verdicts appear to satisfy automatically
the statutory requirements that elements of damages be itemized
in medical malpractice awards 26 and that fault be apportioned
27
among multiple tortfeasors in other negligence actions.
Gerard A. Hefner

DoMiSTIc RELATIONS LAW

Visitation of adopted child by natural grandparents properly
may be sought under DRL § 72
Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law accords grandparents a procedure to secure visitation with a minor grandchild when
"either or both of the parents of a minor child . . . isor are deceased."2 8 Once a child is adopted, however, the legal relationship
spect to the law only to the degree reasonably necessary to answer the questions presented.
See note 2 supra. In such cases, the jury is less able to predict the legal effect of its factual
conclusions. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 816 (1948).
24 See, e.g., Quigley v. County of Suffolk, 75 App. Div. 2d 888, 889, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 46, 47
(2d Dep't 1980); notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra. The factual determinations
rendered incident to special verdicts are readily available to appellate courts since the clerk
of the court must "make an entry in his minutes specifying ... the general verdict and any
answers to written interrogatories, or the questions and answers or other written findings
constituting the special verdict." CPLR 4112 (1963).
28 See generally CPLR 4111(d), commentary at 95-96 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
26 See CPLR 4111(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Subsection (d)requires that a verdict in a medical malpractice action "specify the applicable elements of special and general
damages upon which the award is based and the amount assigned to each element." Id.
'7 See, e.g., Noga v. Monroe Medi-Trans, 78 App. Div. 2d 988, 988, 433 N.Y.S.2d 927,
928 (4th Dep't 1980); SmaGEL § 399, at 522; 4 WK&M 1 4111.05, at 41-195 to 41-196. See
generally CPLR 1401-04, 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
" DRL § 72 (1977) (original version at ch. 631, § 1 [1966] N.Y. Laws 1391, amended by
ch. 431, § 1 [1975] N.Y. Laws 620 (McKinney)); see Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522,
526-27, 355 N.E.2d 372, 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 412, 414-15, alf'd on remand, 54 App. Div. 2d
582, 387 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't 1976). Section 72 of the Domestic Relations Law provides:
Where either or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within this
state, is or are deceased, or where circumstances show that conditions exist which
equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of such child
may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child
brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after
due notice to the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody,
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between the natural parent and the adopted child is terminated.29
and control of such child, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe,
may make such directions as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child.
DRL § 72 (1977). Prior to the enactment of section 72, grandparents, having no legal right
to visitation with their grandchildren, were forced to accept a custodial parent's decision
regarding any visitation. The common-law rule was expressed in Noll v. Non, 277 App. Div.
286, 288-89, 98 N.Y.S.2d 938, 940-41 (4th Dep't 1950) wherein the court refused to order a
right of visitation by the paternal grandparents over the objections of the child's mother.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Marks v. Grenier, 249 App. Div. 564, 565, 293 N.Y.S. 364, 365-66
(lst Dep't), aff'd, 274 N.Y. 613, 10 N.E.2d 577 (1937); People ex rel. Schacter v. Kahn, 241
App. Div. 686, 686, 269 N.Y.S. 173, 174 (2d Dep't 1934). Exceptions to the common-law rule
were rare. In Benner v. Benner, 113 Cal. App. 2d 531, 248 P.2d 425 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952),
visitation rights were granted to a grandmother in a divorce proceeding where the child
lived with her grandmother for 3 years and separation would have caused the child emotional harm. Id. at 532, 248 P.2d at 426. Moreover, in Kay v. Kay, 112 N.E.2d 562 (Ohio Ct.
Common Pleas 1953), the court held that court-ordered visitation could be granted to a
grandparent who demonstrated that the custodial parent is unfit to determine visitation. Id.
at 564. For an analysis of the common-law rule and its exceptions, see Foster & Freed,
GrandparentVisitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 643, 645-53 (1979).
Due to the inequity of the common-law approach, legal recognition of a grandparent's
right to visitation was secured by the enactment of DRL § 72. See Memorandum of Assemblyman Goldstein, reprinted in [1966] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 14-15. This section, however, was
not intended to give grandparents an absolute right of visitation, but rather to provide them
with an opportunity to present their interest to the court. Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d
522, 526, 355 N.E.2d 372, 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415, aff'd on remand, 54 App. Div. 2d 582,
387 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't 1976). The decision as to whether visitation will be granted rests
solely in the discretion of the court after an evaluation of the child's best interest. 40 N.Y.2d
at 527, 355 N.E.2d at 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
29 See DRL § 117 (1977). Section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law provides in partAfter the making of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child
shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and
shall have no rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or
succession, except as hereinafter stated.
The rights of an adoptive child to inheritance and succession from and
through his natural parents shall terminate upon the making of the order of adoption except as hereinafter provided.
The adoptive parents or parent and the adoptive child shall sustain toward
each other the legal relation of parent and child and shall have all the rights and
be subject to all the duties of that relation including the rights of inheritance from
and through each other and the natural and adopted kindred of the adoptive parents or parent.
DRL § 117(1) (1977); see, e.g., Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 87, 11 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1937); Doe
v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 436, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (2d Dep't 1971). Section 117 succeeds in making the adopted child the "natural child" of the adoptive parents. See Carpenter v. Buffalo Gen. Elec. Co., 213 N.Y. 101, 108, 106 N.E. 1026, 1028 (1914); Charles v.
James, 56 Misc. 2d 1056, 1058, 290 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (Family Ct. Kings County 1968);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 15 Misc. 2d 1048, 1050, 182 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995 (Child. Ct. Saratoga County 1959) (Carpenterand Anonymous deal with section 117's predecessor, DRL §
115). The statute divests the natural parents of any relation to the child and gives all the
rights of parent and child to the adopted child and his adoptive parents. Betz v. Horr, 276
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In light of such annulment of the parent-child relationship, it has
been unsettled whether the natural grandparents of an adopted
child are precluded from seeking visitation under section 72.0 Recently, in People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard 1 the Court of Appeals
held that adoption will not operate to bar a grandparent access to
32
the section 72 mechanism.
In Sibley, a minor child had resided, since birth, with his
mother and maternal grandmother.3 The child's father was deceased.3 4 Prior to the child's second birthday, his mother died and
he was removed from his grandmother's home, placed in a children's home, and thereafter adopted by his paternal grandparents.3 5 The maternal grandmother regularly visited the child until

his adoption, at which time the adoptive parents obstructed her
attempts to visit." Consequently, she commenced this action pursuant to section 72.37 The Supreme Court, New York County, upheld the grandparent's right to rely upon section 72, despite the
adoption of the child, and awarded visitation rights.3 8 The AppelN.Y. at 87-88, 11 N.E.2d at 550; Charles v. James, 56 Misc. 2d at 1058, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
30 Compare People ex rel. Herman v. Lebovits, 66 Misc. 2d 830, 832, 322 N.Y.S.2d 123,
125-26 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) and People ex rel. Levine v. Rado, 54 Misc. 2d 843, 845,
283 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485-86 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967) (visitation rights do not survive
adoption) with Scranton v. Hutter, 40 App. Div. 2d 296, 299, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711 (4th
Dep't 1973) and People ex rel. Simmons v. Sheridan, 98 Misc. 2d 328, 333, 414 N.Y.S.2d 83,
86 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (adoption does not preclude a grandparent from applying
for visitation rights). Discord also exists among other jurisdictions regarding grandparents'
visitation rights subsequent to a child's adoption. Courts in California, New Jersey and Ohio
have allowed such visitation. See Roquemore v. Roquemore, 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 432, 435 (Ct App. 1969); Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 436, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975);
Graziano v. Davis, 50 Ohio App. 2d 83, 361 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Ct. App. 1976). Courts in
Florida and Texas have taken the opposite view. See Lee v. Kepler, 197 So. 2d 570, 573 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). For
an in-depth analysis of grandparents' visitation rights in Texas, see Gault, GrandparentGrandchild Visitation, 37 Tax. B.J. 433 (1974).
31 54 N.Y.2d 320, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1981), aftg 79 App. Div. 2d 896
(1st Dep't 1980) (mem.).
32 54 N.Y.2d at 326, 429 N.E.2d at 1051-52, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23.
33 Id. at 322-23, 429 N.E.2d at 1050, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
3"Id. at 322, 429 N.E.2d at 1049, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
35 Id. at 323, 429 N.E.2d at 1050, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 421. While the child and his mother
were living in the maternal grandmother's home, a neglect proceeding was brought against
the child's mother resulting in the child's removal from the grandmother's home. Id. at 32223, 429 N.E.2d at 1050, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The grandmother was not involved in this
proceeding. Id. at 323, 429 N.E.2d at 1050, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
86

Id.

37 Id.
3

Id.
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late Division, First Department, affirmed without opinion."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 0 Chief Judge
Cooke, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that the visitation
statute, on its face, contemplates the situation where the child has
been adopted, 41 and that the adoption statute recognizes the interests of natural relatives in maintaining family ties.42 Moreover,
since the adoption statute was part of state law prior to the enactment of the visitation statute,4 8 the Court concluded that the legislature would have expressly excluded adoption from the purview of
section 72 had that been its intention."
Finding that natural grandparents may use section 72 as a vehicle for asserting their visitation rights, the Sibley Court thereupon decided in favor of the section's constitutionality. In this regard, the Court, without distinguishing between natural and
adoptive families, observed that parents have a constitutional right
to raise their families "as they see fit."' 45 Nevertheless, upon commenting that "parents are not totally free to act as they please,"
" 79 App. Div. 2d 896 (lst Dep't 1980) (mem.).
40 54 N.Y.2d at 323, 429 N.E.2d at 1050, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
4 Id. at 323-24, 429 N.E.2d at 1050, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The Sibley Court noted that

the statute "permits a proceeding against any person who has custody" of the child, id. at
325, 429 N.E.2d at 1051, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 422, and stated that the statute does not exempt a
person who obtains custody through adoption. Id.; cf. Scranton v. Hutter, 40 App. Div. 2d
296, 298, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710 (4th Dep't 1973) (court observed that the requirement of
notice to "any parent having custody of the grandchild" suggests that adoption was intended to be covered).
42 54 N.Y.2d at 323, 429 N.E.2d at 1050, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 421. Chief Judge Cooke reasoned that since section 117 deals with bequests to a child from its natural relatives, it
contemplates the continuation of natural family ties after adoption. Id.; see DRL § 117(2)
(1977) (section 117(2) severs rights of inheritance through descent, not distribution of property through a will). Thus, the Court found that natural relatives having a desire to "perpetuate [a] sense of family" may do so by "[b]equeathing property to the adopted child." 54
N.Y.2d at 325, 429 N.E.2d at 1051, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 422. See generally Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 469-70, 501-14 (1972).
43 54 N.Y.2d at 325, 429 N.E.2d at 1051, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 422. Formerly section 115 of
the DRL, ch. 606, § 1 [1938] N.Y. Laws 1610, 1615 (current version at DRL § 117 (1977)),
the section was amended in 1966 to preserve an adopted child's interest under a will made
by a member of his natural family. Ch. 14, § 2 [1966] N.Y. Laws 35-36. Since this was the
same year that the grandparent visitation statute was enacted, the Court asserted that the
legislature was "presumed to know what statutes are in effect when it enacts new laws." 54
N.Y.2d at 325, 429 N.E.2d at 1051, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 422. See generally Easley v. New York
State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y.2d 374, 379, 135 N.E.2d 572, 575, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 31 (1956).
"" 54 N.Y.2d at 325, 429 N.E.2d at 1051, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 422; cf. In re Santacose, 271
App. Div. 11, 16, 61 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (4th Dep't 1946) (since adoption is created by statute, in
derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed).
15 54 N.Y.2d at 326, 429 N.E.2d at 1052, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
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the Court held that a section 72 intrusion should be tested under
the standard of whether the state's interest in regulating the famfly relationship bears "a reasonable relation to any end within the
competency of the State. '46 Noting that the state legitimately may
act to protect the best interest of children, the Court found that
section 72, which affords grandparents standing to show that their
visitation would be beneficial to a child, is reasonably related to
the furtherance of such child's best interest. 7 The Court observed,
moreover, that since the adoptive relationship is statutory, 8 the
right of visitation is consistent with the state's power to supervise
in the child's best interest after the child's adoption. 49 In light of
the beneficial effects of visitation in the instant case, the Court
concluded that it was in the child's best interest to grant his maternal grandmother visitation.50
In clarifying the legal status of grandparents who can use the
procedural mechanism of section 72 to claim visitation rights, it is
submitted that the Sibley Court correctly interpreted the section
to encompass legal and natural grandparents. Such an interpretation recognizes that court evaluation of what is in the best interest
of a child is the proper procedure to promote the welfare of such
child.51 Indeed, by facilitating access to the court, section 72
46 Id. at 327, 429 N.E.2d at 1052, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 423 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 403 (1923)); see, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 643 (1974);
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). Relying on Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Sibley Court found that the liberty interest of parents in
raising their families was not absolute. 54 N.Y.2d at 327, 429 N.E.2d at 1052, 445 N.Y.S.2d
at 423. In Prince, the Supreme Court, in upholding the state's child-labor laws, 321 U.S. at
168-69, found that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest." Id. at
166. See generally Note, Delineating the Reasonable Progress Ground as a Basis for Termination of ParentalRights-In re Austin, 28 DE PAUL L. Rav. 819, 826-30 (1979).
47 54 N.Y.2d at 329, 429 N.E.2d at 1053, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
48 Id. at 327, 429 N.E.2d at 1052, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 423. The Sibley Court noted that
adoption did not exist at common law. Id.; see In re Thorne, 155 N.Y. 140, 143-44, 49 N.E.
661, 662 (1898).
41 54 N.Y.2d at 327-28, 429 N.E.2d at 1052-53, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 423-24. Since the state
has created the adoptive relationship, Chief Judge Cooke reasoned that the state could define its parameters. Id. at 327, 429 N.E.2d at 1052, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
50 Id. at 328-29, 429 N.E.2d at 1053, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 424. The factual circumstances
which the Court considered in deciding to allow the child's grandmother the right to visitation included the close contact maintained between the child and his natural family, the
agreement between the parties that continued visitation would be in the child's best interest, and the fact that maintaining the anonymity and privacy of the child's natural and
adoptive parents was not a concern. Id.
I" The strong policy consideration of promoting the best interest of the child supports
the Sibley Court's result that section 72 withstands a subsequent adoption. See Scranton v.
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merely supplants resort to traditional equitable5 2 and legal

3

reme-

dies pursuant to which adoption was not prohibitive of visitation,
but rather, was a factor to be considered in assessing the best interest of a child." Thus, since section 72 does not create any rights
Hutter, 40 App. Div. 2d 296, 298-99, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708, 710-11 (4th Dep't 1973). In Scranton, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upon considering the legislative intent, concluded that adoption does not automatically preclude a grandparent's right to seek visitation with that child. Id. at 299, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 711. Notably, when section 72 was originally
enacted, Assemblyman Noah Goldstein discussed the need to preserve established relationships after the death of one or both of the child's parents. Additionally, he noted that the
visitation statute was designed to safeguard a beneficial grandparent-grandchild relationship. See Memorandum of Assemblyman Goldstein, reprinted in [1966] N.Y. LEais. ANN.
14. Subsequently, in 1975, section 72 was amended to allow grandparents to seek a court
determination of visitation rights "where circumstances show that conditions exist which
equity would see fit to intervene." DRL § 72 (1977). Noting the effect of expanding a court's
jurisdiction to evaluate other situations where grandparents may seek visitation, Senator
Leon Giuffreda observed that the courts would now have greater flexibility to promote the
welfare of the child. See Memorandum of Senator Giuffreda, reprinted in [1975] N.Y.
LEGis. ANN. 51.
Moreover, it is submitted that an approach which does not make the child's interest
paramount would work great injustice. For example, to allow adoption to bar judicial determination of grandparent-grandchild visitation would frustrate the remedial purpose of section 72. See Note, Adoption: Visitation Rights of Natural Grandparents,32 OKLA. L. REV.
645, 648-49 & nn.25-30 (1979). See also Note, Visitation Rights of a GrandparentOver the
Objection of a Parent: The Best Interests of the Child, 15 J. FAm. L. 51, 74 (1976-1977)
(suggests that the court is "shirk[ing] its legitimate duty. to oversee the best interests of all
minor children."). Additionally, distinguishing between relative-adoption and strangeradoption to determine when an adoption will bar use of section 72 is too arbitrary. But see
Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 435-36, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975). Significantly, three states
allow judicial discretion in granting visitation after a relative adoption. See Lee v. Kepler,
197 So. 2d 570, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Smith v. Trosclair, 321 So. 2d 514, 515-16 (La.
1975); Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 525-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). Other states
have enacted statutes which permit grandparent visitation after adoption. See CAL. Cirv.
CODE § 197.5 (Deering Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(3) (West Supp. 1981); OKL.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (West Supp. 1980-1981).
52 See In re McDevitt, 176 App. Div. 418, 423, 162 N.Y.S. 1032, 1035 (2d Dep't), alf'd,
221 N.Y. 598, 117 N.E. 1076 (1917). The McDevitt court, in dictum, stated that "[tihe Supreme Court has ample power at law and in equity to promote the welfare of the child,
notwithstanding a legal adoption. The power to permit and to regulate visitation... is, of
course, included." 176 App. Div. at 423, 162 N.Y.S. at 1035 (citations omitted). Current
courts retain this equitable power to grant visitation rights, dictated by their concern for the
welfare of the child. See In re Anonymous v. Anonymous, 50 Misc. 2d 43, 45, 269 N.Y.S.2d
500, 503 (Family Ct. Queens County 1966). See also In re Adoption of N., 78 Misc. 2d 105,
109-10, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960-61 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
53 At common law, grandparents had no legal right to petition the courts to secure visitation rights with their grandchildren. See Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 645-53; Note,
Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents:One Step Closer to the Best Interests of the
Child, 26 CATH. U.L. Rv. 387, 388-92 (1977). Certain exceptions existed, however. See id.
Thus, although no independent legal remedy existed, grandparents were accorded a right to
petition the courts when they fell within a recognized exception to the common-law rule.
"
Where a jurisdiction excepted to the common-law rule and used a "best interests"
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to visitation, but expressly affords only a procedure to facilitate a
court determination of visitation rights,5 5 there appears to be no
reason to frustrate access to this mechanism when a child has been
adopted."
approach to assess grandparents' petitions for visitation, adoption of the child became one
important consideration for the court in determining whether to grant visitation. See Note,
Visitation Rights of a Grandparent,supra note 51, at 59-73.
55 DRL § 72 (1977); see Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 527, 355 N.E.2d 372, 375,
387 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415, aff'd on remand, 54 App. Div. 2d 582, 387 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't
1976).
BeAlthough the adoption statute protects the new family unit by assuring family integrity, see generally 1 M. SCHAPiRO, A STUDY oF ADOPTION PRACTICE (1956), a complete severance of all ties with the natural family is not mandated when such would work severe hardship on a child's welfare. See Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 663-67. Of course, since the
language of the adoption statute provides for termination of the legal relations between a
child and his natural family, DRL § 117(1) (1977), an argument can be made that visitation
rights of natural grandparents must also be severed. See In re Adoption of Gardiner, 287
N.W.2d 555, 558 (Iowa 1980). The court in Gardinerreasoned that since the grandparent's
status and right to visitation arose by virtue of the child's relationship to the natural parents, termination of the natural parent's rights by adoption removed the basis for the grandparent's rights. Id. Such an interpretation, however, fails to harmonize the objective of
maintaining adoptive family integrity with the overall scheme of promoting the child's welfare. Cf. Graziano v. Davis, 50 Ohio App. 2d 83, 361 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Ct. App. 1976) (interpreting analogous Ohio adoption laws). Furthermore, since the purpose of sections 72 and
117 is to promote the best interest of the child, the Sibley Court's conjunctive reading of the
visitation and adoption statutes is consistent with the axiom of pari materia.2A C. SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIoN § 51.03 (4th ed. 1973). Moreover, because the visitation statute includes the situation in which either or both parents of the child are deceased, DRL § 72 (1977), it can be inferred that adoption of the child was contemplated,
and thus would not interfere with the grandparent's rights under the statute. Cf. Mimkon v.
Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 436 & n.4, 332 A.2d 199, 204 & n.4 (1975) (interpreting analogous New
Jersey visitation laws).
Concededly, court implementation of visitation rights must account for the unique circumstances of each case, and the judge must use his discretion in determining whether to
award visitation. See Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 527, 355 N.E.2d 372, 375, 387
N.Y.S.2d 412, 415, aff'd on remand, 54 App. Div. 2d 582, 387 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't 1976).
In Lo Presti, the Court stated that "[t]he question of whether visitation should be granted
lies solely in the discretion of the court and must ... be determined in the light of what is
. ." Id. (citations omitted). This comports with
required in the best interests of the child..
declared legislative intentions. See Memorandum of Assemblyman Goldstein, reprinted in
[1966] N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 14. Assemblyman Noah Goldstein stated that "granting to grandparents the right to visit their grandchild would be solely in the discretion of the Court."
Id.; see In re Ehrlich v. Ressner, 55 App. Div. 2d 953, 953, 391 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (2d Dep't
1977); Geri v. Fanto, 79 Misc. 2d 947, 949, 361 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987 (Family Ct. Kings County
1974). As a practical matter, of course, it is essential that, when a judicial determination
must be made of a child's best interest, the practitioner present a great array of facts and
sociological studies to the court to guide the judge's decision. Although courts may never be
able to predict adequately the child's needs, it is important that they be able to make an
informed decision. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 3-8 (1973). It has also been suggested that the ideal situation would be to have
independent counsel representing children. Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 650 & n.42.
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Significantly, upon finding that natural grandparents may assert the section 72 visitation mechanism, the Sibley Court placed
adoptive parents on the same legal footing as natural parents, albeit implicitly, with respect to their constitutional right of familial
integrity.5 7 It is submitted that such an approach was warranted.
Concededly, the Supreme Court, to date, has not expressly accorded adoptive families all the rights to which natural families
may lay claim."' Nonetheless, it appears that adoptive families, although creatures of statute,5 9 should be subject to the penumbra of
Although the judge will focus on the best interest of the child, it has been asserted that
judicial intervention should be a last resort and that conciliation and counseling of the
adoptive family members and concerned grandparents would be more beneficial to the child.
See Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 664. Notwithstanding the fact that judicial discretion
may result in inconsistent holdings, such inconsistencies may be tempered by appellate review. For instance, custody and visitation determinations are subject to review or modification. See People ex rel. Levine v. Rado, 54 Misc. 2d 843, 844, 283 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1967). A visitation judgment will be reversed when there has been an
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hood v. Connaughton, 75 App. Div. 2d 582, 583, 426 N.Y.S.2d
574, 575 (2d Dep't 1980) (overly extensive visitation rights will impede child's adjustment to
new family); Lachow v. Barasch, 57 App. Div. 2d 896, 896, 394 N.Y.S.2d 284, 284 (2d Dep't
1977) (denial of visitation on grounds of acrimony is abuse of court's discretion).
5 See 54 N.Y.2d at 327, 429 N.E.2d at 1052, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
" Notably, the courts currently are faced with the difficult task of assessing the extent
of constitutional protection to which various types of state-created families may lay claim.
In this regard, although commentators have equated the "psychological family" relationship,
created by the state between a foster parent and a child, with the natural family relationship, see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 56 at 9-20, 22-26, the courts have
been apprehensive. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), defined the family as inhering in the blood relationship, id. at 843, but recognized that psychological parenthood can also exist in the absence of blood-ties. Id. at 843-44. Yet, when the Court compared the liberty interest of the
natural parent to that of the foster parent, the Court found only "the most limited constitutional 'liberty' in the foster family." Id. at 846. Reasoning that natural parents' liberty interest was greater because it was based on a basic human right, id., the Court suggested that
other things being equal, relations by blood will override a psychological interest. Id. at 84647. The Court implied, however, that a different result would have been reached had there
been an adoptive relationship. Id. at 824, 827 n.19, 844 n.51, 846. Similarly, in Drummond v.
Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978), the court found no constitutionally protected familial right of
privacy in the foster parents. 563 F.2d at 1206. Noting that the foster relationship is a temporary arrangement, the Drummond court stated that "[t]me liberty rights do not flow from
state laws,. . . they have a more stable source in our notions of intrinsic human rights." Id.
at 1207. Additionally, the court found the liberty interest of the foster family limited by the
state laws which created the relationship. Id. The court also made references to treating
adoptive family integrity similar to the natural family's protected liberty interest. Id. To
date, however, the Supreme Court has not placed the adoptive relationship on the same
constitutional footing as the natural family relationship.
59 See DRL §§ 114, 117 (1977); note 48 and accompanying text supra.
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rights which the fourteenth amendment has been held to afford.60
Emilia M. Naccarato

ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAWS

EPTL § 3-4.3: Separation agreement containing general release
of rights held insufficient to revoke specific will bequests to
spouse
EPTL § 3-4.3 provides that any conveyance, settlement, or other
60The principle establishing a liberty interest of familial integrity evolved from the
fourteenth amendment due process clause of the United States Constitution. In the seminal
case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
state law prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to a child not yet in the eighth grade
because it deprived parents of their due process liberty to "establish a home and bring up
children." Id. at 399. Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the
Supreme Court noted that parents have the right to direct their children's education free
from unreasonable state interference. Id. at 518-19. Recently, the Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), upon upholding the right of Amish parents to instill their own
religious beliefs in their children, held that such parents were not required to comply with
compulsory education laws. Id. at 213-14. This analysis has been extended to the right of a
parent to custody where the family unit is of paramount concern. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651, 658 (1972). Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has viewed the family
as protected by the due process liberty interest and has upheld parent's rights to raise their
families. See Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 193, 272 N.E.2d 567, 570, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71, 75
(1971); People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 468, 113 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1953);
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952); People ex
rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 287, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1936) (per curiam).
Additionally, the Supreme Court has articulated a fundamental right to privacy implicit
in the due process liberty clause. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right
of privacy includes a married couple's use of contraception). Subsequently, the basis for
many family protection decisions was the fundamental right of privacy. This right, however,
was extended only to situations directly affecting the marital relationship. In Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that the constitution protects individuals
in "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education." Id.; e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(constitution protects sanctity of the family); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639-40 (1974) (woman has a right to determine whether to bear a child); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (woman has a right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (constitution guarantees the right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (fundamental right to marry and procreate). See
generally Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rv.1, 31-62 (1980). Notwithstanding the fundamental right of
privacy, the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), stated that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." Id. at 386. This holding recognizes that domestic relations is "an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States."
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).

